Question by vote out all RINOs: What experience exactly can Sarah Palin offer our President on Oil Spills?
INTRODUCTION TO THE EXXON VALDEZ LITIGATION
On March 23, 1989, the supertanker EXXON VALDEZ pulled out of Valdez, Alaska, loaded with more than 56 million gallons of crude oil. Captain Joseph Hazelwood, the master of the vessel, had spent the day drinking with crew members. Bartenders testified that he had consumed at least eight vodka doubles, and Coast Guard tests showed his blood alcohol level stood at .241 — more than six times the permissible level under Coast Guard regulations. Third Mate Gregory Cousins was on duty beyond the limits specified by federal fatigue laws. Hazelwood, Cousins and the rest of the crew faced a night voyage through ice in Prince William Sound.
Hazelwood’s intoxication was evident from the alcohol on his breath, his speech (captured on audiotape) and, most of all, his actions as his ship navigated the Sound. While passing through fishing grounds, Hazelwood took the EXXON VALDEZ outside established shipping lanes to avoid ice. He put the vessel on automatic pilot, accelerating directly at Bligh Reef. Hazelwood then left the bridge in violation of federal pilotage regulations. As he went below, Hazelwood gave vague instructions to the inexperienced and fatigued Cousins. Within minutes, the supertanker struck Bligh Reef, spilling 11 million gallons of oil, “the largest oil spill and greatest environmental disaster in American history.”
At trial the jury learned how Exxon’s management of its shipping company made such a catastrophe inevitable. ["Exxon" refers to Exxon Corporation and its subsidiary (and former division) Exxon Shipping Company.] Exxon knew that the results of a major oil spill in the Sound would be as horrendous as they turned out to be, and it so stipulated at trial. Exxon also knew that Hazelwood had a history of alcoholism and poor judgment that made his command of the EXXON VALDEZ a recipe for disaster. After Hazelwood went through an alcohol rehabilitation program in 1985, Exxon made no provision for post-treatment evaluation, aftercare or monitoring. Instead, it immediately reassigned Hazelwood to command, fully understanding that a master “with an alcohol abuse problem was a potential for a disaster to the environment.” Exxon senior management received repeated reports of Hazelwood’s open drinking between 1985 and 1989, but did nothing about it.
In 1989, Exxon’s chairman admitted that putting Hazelwood in charge of a supertanker was a “gross error.” At trial, an Exxon manager conceded that Exxon’s “policies, knowing the risk to the public, of the catastrophic results of a supertanker accident, allow[ed] a relapsed alcoholic to command a supertanker,” and that Exxon’s attitude toward alcohol left him with “no policy to protect the safety of the public.” The evidence also showed that Exxon regularly violated federal fatigue laws and that its loaded tankers regularly departed Valdez in dangerous night-time ice conditions, simply to save money.
Exxon stipulated that its negligence caused this disaster. In Phase I of the trial, the jury found that Exxon and Hazelwood in fact had been reckless. And in Phase 111, the jury decided that the conduct of both Hazelwood and Exxon required assessment of punitive damages as a punishment and deterrent. In awarding billion against Exxon, the jury considered Exxon’s binding trial stipulation that its conduct had caused compensable harm of between 2 million and 8 million (not counting hundreds of millions in harm to tens of thousands of plaintiffs dismissed under the “Robins Dry Dock” doctrine). This award represented less than one-quarter of the increase in Exxon’s value, measured by market capitalization, from the time of the spill to the time of trial.
Throughout this complex litigation, Exxon and Hazelwood received extraordinary procedural and substantive protections. Punitive damages were assessed as a single sum for a mandatory class of all punitive damage claimants, guaranteeing that the defendants would face punitive damages only once. Through the bifurcation of punitive damage issues, Exxon had two opportunities to avoid any punitive damage liability. The court repeatedly told the jury that punitive damages were not favored. The Phase III punitive damage instructions endorsed nearly every mitigating factor asserted by Exxon. Further, most of Exxon’s motions to exclude evidence were granted, and almost all of the evidence that it requested be excluded was excluded.
http://www.jomiller.com/exxonvaldez/articles/intro.html
@Ci Ci
“she can offer her experience on control of oil, and oil overall.”
Are you fing kidding me. Do you really think that other than getting campaign funding, she has any knowledge of Oil operations?
I fill my tank everyday, does that give me experience LOL
@ Dastard
My point exactly.
Best answer:
Answer by purpleshamrock
Sarah Palin is probably one of the dumbest people in America. She can’t offer anything to us.
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